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Battle Scars? The Puzzling Decline in Employment and Rise in Disability
Receipt Among Vietnam Era Veterans
Abstract
Using Current Population Survey and US Army administrative data, we document that between 2000 and
2010, the employment rate of Vietnam era veterans fell markedly relative to non-veterans of the same cohorts
while simultaneously their enrollment increased steeply in the Veterans Disability Compensation (DC)
program, which provides healthcare and transfer payments to veterans with service-connected disabilities.
Thirty percent of Vietnam era Army veterans enrolled in DC in 2006 received benefits for Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, with median annual payments of $25,500. The declining employment and rising transfer
payments to Vietnam era veterans underscore the long-term private and public costs of wartime service,
potentially stemming from both adverse health consequences and policies that have expanded benefits
eligibility.
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The impact of military service in the Vietnam 
War on the well-being of veterans has been a 
contentious topic since at least the war’s end. 
A focal point of discussion is the prevalence of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among 
Vietnam veterans. According to the influential 
National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study 
(Richard A. Kulka and William E. Schlenger 
1988), 15 percent of Vietnam veterans were suf-
fering from PTSD in 1988 and 31 percent had 
experienced PTSD cumulatively. More than 30 
years after the war’s conclusion, this topic has 
gained renewed salience due to the rapid rise 
in the number of Vietnam era veterans receiv-
ing Disability Compensation (DC) payments 
for PTSD, which approximately tripled—from 
90,695 to 268,865—between 1999 and 2010 
(US Department of Veterans Affairs, various 
years). Only veterans can qualify for the DC 
program, which provides a monthly stipend, not 
subject to state or federal taxation, as well as 
health insurance to veterans with disabilities that 
were caused or aggravated by military service.1
At the heart of the debate regarding PTSD, 
and the prevalence of disability payments more 
broadly, is the degree to which high and rising 
DC claims among Vietnam era veterans reflect 
the long-term deleterious consequences of 
1 For dissenting viewpoints on the prevalence of PTSD 
among Vietnam veterans, see B. G. Burkett and Glenna 
Whitley (1998) and Bruce P. Dohrenwend et al. (2006) 
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 wartime military service versus the incentive 
and nonincentive effects of the generous DC 
program.2 Recently, Joshua D. Angrist, Stacey 
H. Chen, and Brigham R. Frandsen (2010) 
exploited exogenous variation in military draft 
probabilities among men born in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s to study the causal effect of 
military service on labor force participation, 
self-reported disability, and receipt of disabil-
ity benefits. As of the year 2000, they find that 
Vietnam era service had little effect on overall 
employment rates or self-reported health status. 
Focusing on men with low potential earnings, 
however, they uncover evidence of a negative 
causal effect of military service on their employ-
ment and a positive causal effect on receipt of 
disability benefits. They cautiously attribute this 
reduction in labor supply to the DC program.
This brief paper makes three contributions to 
our understanding of employment and disabil-
ity among Vietnam era veterans. It documents a 
substantial divergence in overall labor force par-
ticipation and disability benefits receipt between 
Vietnam era veterans and their nonveteran con-
temporaries in the ten years since the time period 
considered by Angrist et al. (2010). It next uses 
unique administrative records from the US Army 
to better inform the debate about causes and 
consequences of PTSD, offering detailed com-
parisons of the military service and human capi-
tal attributes of Vietnam era veterans according 
to their DC status. Finally, it highlights the dif-
ficulty in distinguishing between deteriorating 
health and the direct consequences of the DC 
program in causing the relative declines in labor 
force participation among Vietnam era veterans.
2 As discussed in Autor and Duggan (2007), DC benefits 
may reduce labor supply through two channels: a nonincen-
tive income effect, which raises demand for leisure; and an 
incentive effect, whereby veterans with significant disabili-
ties may qualify for substantially enhanced payments if the 
VA determines that their disabilities preclude work. Melissa 
A. Boyle and Joanna N. Lahey (2010) also find that access 
to VA health insurance may reduce labor force participation 
among veterans. 
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I. Rising Disability Compensation Receipt among 
Vietnam Era Veterans
After remaining fairly stable at about 9 per-
cent in the late 1990s through September 2000, 
DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans 
has since increased rapidly, and stood at 15.1 
percent by September 2010. During that same 
period, the average annual benefit received by 
Vietnam era DC recipients increased by 44 per-
cent, from $10,200 in 2000 to $14,700 by 2010. 
Because of this rapid growth among Vietnam 
era veterans and a similar surge among veterans 
from the Gulf War and the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), total DC expenditures approximately 
doubled in the past decade, from $18.7 billion in 
2000 to $36.5 billion in 2010.3
The recent rise in DC enrollment and ben-
efit payments among Vietnam era veterans has 
two proximate causes. One is a policy change 
in July 2001 that allowed Vietnam veterans with 
diabetes mellitus who had served with “boots 
on the ground” (BOG)—that is, in the combat 
theatre—to qualify for DC benefits. This policy 
was prompted by a 2000 National Institute of 
Medicine study that suggested that exposure 
to Agent Orange and other herbicides used in 
Vietnam may have increased veterans’ risk of 
developing diabetes. The share of Vietnam era 
veterans receiving DC benefits for diabetes 
surged immediately after this policy change. By 
2010, slightly more than 8 percent of BOG vet-
erans were receiving DC benefits for diabetes, 
a rate that is similar to the estimated prevalence 
of diabetes among US adults in the relevant age 
bracket.
The second key factor is a steady increase in 
the fraction of Vietnam era veterans qualifying 
for DC with a condition of PTSD. From 1999 to 
2010, the fraction of Vietnam era veterans on DC 
with a PTSD diagnosis more than tripled. The 
belated rise in PTSD is unprecedented. Among 
Korean War veterans, for example, PTSD was 
not among the top ten service-connected disabil-
ity diagnoses in 2000, approximately 40 years 
after that war’s conclusion.
Using US Army personnel records for the 
period 1998–2006 (detailed below), Figure 1 
documents the contribution of diabetes and 
3 Figures inflated to real 2010 dollars using the CPI-U 
price series. 
PTSD diagnoses to rising DC receipt among 
Vietnam era veterans. Between 1999 and 2006, 
the fraction of all Vietnam Army veterans 
receiving DC rose from 10.7 to 16.5 percent. 
Excluding those with a diagnosis of either dia-
betes or PTSD, this fraction remained stable at 
approximately 8 percent throughout the 1998–
2006 period. These numbers are even more 
pronounced among BOG Vietnam Army veter-
ans. Between 1998 and 2006, their rate of DC 
benefit receipt rose from 13.3 to 22.7 percent. 
Excluding BOG veterans with PTSD and dia-
betes, however, this fraction declined slightly, 
from 10.0 to 9.6 percent.4
II. Diverging Disability and Employment Rates 
between Veterans and Nonveterans, 2000–2010
We use individual-level data from the March 
2000 and March 2010 Current Population 
Survey to document changes in the relationship 
between Vietnam era military service and labor 
market outcomes. We estimate the following 
linear probability model for labor force nonpar-
ticipation, self-reported disability, and receipt of 
disability transfer income for Vietnam era veter-
ans and males of the same cohorts who did not 
serve, focusing on males born between 1945 and 
4 Of course, some of those receiving benefits for dia-
betes or PTSD would have received DC even absent these 
diagnoses. 
Figure 1. Disability Compensation Receipt among 
Vietnam Era Army Veterans, 1998–2006:  
Overall Rate and Rate by Diagnosis
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1950 inclusive (the cohorts with the highest rate 
of Vietnam service):
  Y it =  α t +  β 1t VE V i +  X i β 2t +  e it .
Controls included in vector X in this model are 
age (six single year-of-age indicators), educa-
tion (four indicators), race, ethnicity, and marital 
status. The parameter of interest,  β 1t , estimates 
the conditional mean difference in outcomes 
between Vietnam era veterans and demographi-
cally similar nonveterans of the same cohorts. 
The parameter estimates are subscripted by t 
because the model is estimated separately by 
year.
Table 1 shows that the relationship between 
Vietnam era military service and employment 
outcomes has changed substantially in the past 
ten years. Consistent with Angrist et al. (2010), 
we find no significant relationship between 
Vietnam era military service and labor force 
 participation in the year 2000, while veterans had 
a moderately higher incidence of self-reported 
disability.5 Simultaneously, veterans were 
5 The Angrist et al. (2010) estimates for the year 2000 
should be interpreted as causal effects since they are iden-
tified by the draft lottery quasi-experiment. Our OLS 
 estimates for the year 2000 are comparable to their causal 
 substantially more likely (8.1 percentage points) 
to receive disability-related transfer income, 
with the bulk of this difference accounted for by 
their receipt of VA benefits.
The disparities between veterans and non-
veterans increased substantially in the ensuing 
decade. Unexpectedly, we find that in 2010 
Vietnam era veterans were 5.9 percentage points 
less likely to participate in the labor force than 
nonveterans of the same cohorts. This contrast 
is highly significant and more than three times 
as large as the (insignificant) difference of 1.8 
percentage points in 2000. Self-reported disabil-
ity also rose differentially among veterans from 
2000 to 2010. But this rise of 1.2 percentage 
points is smaller than the differential increase 
in labor force nonparticipation. We finally find a 
differential increase of 3.5 percentage points in 
the receipt of disability-related transfer income 
among Vietnam-era veterans between 2000 
and 2010. This rise is on par with the simulta-
neous decline of 4.1 percentage points in the 
labor force participation of veterans relative to 
nonveterans.
III. Which Veterans Receive DC Benefits?
The falling relative employment and ris-
ing DC receipt among Vietnam era veterans 
between 2000 and 2010 is consistent with the 
possibility that veterans’ health differentially 
declined in this decade, presumably due to battle 
scars acquired decades earlier. Alternatively, the 
DC program itself—particularly the expansion 
of diabetes and PTSD awards for BOG veter-
ans—may have caused a significant fraction 
of veterans to exit the labor force prematurely. 
Disentangling these explanations is intrinsically 
challenging since both combat exposure and 
eligibility for DC benefits result from military 
service. But the distinction is critical. The health 
consequences of combat service are largely 
 outside of policymakers’ control, whereas ben-
efits programs for service members are poten-
tially subject to redesign.
In Table 2, we use unique Army personnel 
data to explore the characteristics of Vietnam era 
veterans receiving DC and to consider whether 
either of these interpretations receives  immediate 
effects estimates, but we have no means to ascertain whether 
the OLS and causal effects continue to coincide in 2010. 
Table 1—The Relationship between Vietnam Era 
Military Service, Labor Supply, and Disability 
in 2000 and 2010
Not in 
labor force
Disability 
self-report
Disability 
benefits
Panel A. March 2000 CPS: Ages 49–54
Vietnam era veteran 0.018 0.026** 0.081***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Mean of outcome 0.130 0.107 0.089
Panel B. March 2010 CPS: Ages 59–64
Vietnam era veteran 0.059*** 0.038*** 0.116***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Mean of outcome 0.358 0.183 0.134
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. N = 4,635 in 
2000 and 4,347 in 2010. Variable definitions: disability self-
report equals one if respondent reports “a health problem or 
disability that prevents work or limits the kind or amount of 
work”; disability benefits equals one if income is received 
from SSDI, VA disability compensation or pension, or other 
disability benefits; NILF equals one if respondent is out of 
the labor force (a_lfsr = 7). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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support. These data, developed in cooperation 
with the US Army Office of Economic and 
Manpower Analysis and the US Social Security 
Administration (SSA), combine US Army per-
sonnel records with Veterans Administration 
records on Disability Compensation and Social 
Security data on earnings and SSA administered 
benefits. Of particular interest is information 
on the military service conditions of veterans, 
including military occupation and BOG status, 
as well as human capital characteristics recorded 
at the time of enlistment.6
The comparisons in Table 2 reveal that DC 
recipients differ from other Vietnam era veter-
ans along two key dimensions. A first is their 
 conditions of military service. DC recipients 
were substantially more likely to have seen com-
bat in Vietnam; while 59 percent of the Army 
sample served with boots on the ground, this 
fraction is 81 percent among those receiving 
DC benefits, and 94 percent among those with 
a PTSD diagnosis. A similar contrast is seen 
in military occupational specialty. Whereas 36 
percent of the Army sample served in a combat 
6 We use a 10 percent sample (170,395 records) of 
Vietnam era Army veterans who were born between 1942 
and 1953, commenced military service between 1966 and 
1971, and survived to 2006. The following variables contain 
missing values: nonwhite (0.15 percent); combat occupation 
(8 percent); high school dropout (7 percent); Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score (37 percent). Missing 
values are treated as missing at random in Table 2. Further 
details are provided in Autor and Duggan (2007), and Autor, 
Duggan, and Lyle (2010). 
occupation, this fraction is 39 percent among 
BOG veterans, 47 percent among all DC enroll-
ees, and 60 percent among those with PTSD. 
The prevalence of service-connected disabili-
ties—and PTSD in particular—is clearly over-
whelmingly concentrated among veterans who 
were likely exposed to combat in Vietnam.
The second critical dimension along which 
DC recipients differ from the full sample 
of Army veterans is in their human capital. 
Whereas 28 percent of the Vietnam veterans in 
our sample had not completed high school at the 
time of enlistment, this fraction is 31 percent 
among DC beneficiaries, and 39 percent among 
those with a PTSD diagnosis. Many of these vet-
erans may have obtained further education after 
the war, of course, so these education catego-
ries may not provide a measure of “permanent” 
skills. The AFQT test data tell a similar story, 
however. While 40 percent of the Army sample 
had an AFQT score in the bottom two quin-
tiles of the national AFQT testing distribution, 
this fraction was 48 percent among DC recipi-
ents, and 55 percent among those with a PTSD 
diagnosis. Even among BOG veterans, who 
comprise the vast majority of all PTSD claim-
ants, the PTSD  diagnosis is concentrated among 
veterans with low education and AFQT scores.
The data in Table 2 can be read as support-
ive of either the health or the program-effect 
explanations for the diverging disability and 
employment rates of Vietnam era veterans and 
their civilian contemporaries. On the one hand, 
overall DC enrollment, and PTSD in particular, 
Table 2—Characteristics of Vietnam Army Veterans by Disability Compensation  
Status in 2006
Full 
sample
Boots on 
ground
Not DC 
enrolled
DC 
enrolled
PTSD
 award
Nonwhite 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.17
Boots on ground 0.59 1.00 0.54 0.81 0.94
Combat occupation 0.36 0.39 0.34 0.47 0.60
HS dropout 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.39
AFQT ≤40th percentile 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.48 0.55
DC enrolled 0.17 0.23 0.00 1.00 1.00
PTSD award 0.05 0.08 NA 0.30 1.00
Diabetes award 0.04 0.07 NA 0.24 0.21
DC payment 2,067 2,893 NA 11,358 19,017
 (SD) (6,267) (7,303) NA (11,031) (9,815)
 Median 0 0 NA 5,757 25,557
Fraction of sample 1.00 0.59 0.83 0.17 0.05
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are disproportionately prevalent among Vietnam 
era veterans who had completed no postsecond-
ary education at enlistment and tested in the bot-
tom two quintiles of AFQT. Veterans with these 
characteristics would be expected to have com-
paratively low earnings and labor force partici-
pation, and hence their rising rates of DC receipt 
and declining employment are potentially con-
sistent with behavioral changes induced by the 
availability of DC benefits.
On the other hand, veterans receiving DC ben-
efits—and particularly those with PTSD diagno-
ses—had comparatively high rates of wartime 
combat exposure, which may plausibly have had 
long-term adverse impacts on their physical and 
mental health. Moreover, the lower educational 
attainments and AFQT scores of this subset of 
veterans are considered risk factors for PTSD 
(Michael L. Macklin et al. 1998), presumably 
because individuals with limited cognitive skills 
may have less capacity for absorbing combat’s 
psychic toll. Thus, the rising rates of DC receipt 
and declining employment among BOG vet-
erans is consistent with adverse health conse-
quences of combat exposure.
IV. Discussion
The growth in DC enrollment among Vietnam 
era veterans appears poised to continue in the 
upcoming years due to both ongoing military 
activity and recent further liberalizations in the 
DC program’s medical eligibility criteria. A sig-
nificant issue for policy in the years ahead is the 
growth of the DC program due to the Gulf War 
and the GWOT. At nearly 20 percent, DC enroll-
ment among the 5.1 million veterans who have 
served since August 1990 is substantially higher 
than it has been among veterans from previ-
ous service eras such as Vietnam or the Korean 
Conflict. Additionally, the average monthly 
benefit for Gulf War/GWOT era DC recipients 
has risen by almost 70 percent since 1999. The 
unexpected growth in DC enrollment among 
Vietnam era veterans occurred while most were 
in their fifties and early sixties, but the average 
age of a Gulf War/GWOT era veteran is just 
37. Thus, the potential life-years of DC benefits 
receipt for the typical Gulf War/GWOT era DC 
recipient is much greater than for their Vietnam 
era counterparts.
An equally significant factor affecting the 
long-term costs of combat service is the lifetime 
pattern of labor supply among veterans. While 
our data do not allow us to determine the degree 
to which the sharp relative declines in employ-
ment among Vietnam era veterans in the past 
decade are caused by the long-term adverse 
effects of military service versus the incentive 
and  nonincentive effects of rising cash transfers 
from the DC program, it is self-evident that their 
declining employment has large costs in fore-
gone earnings and tax revenue. For those suffer-
ing from PTSD, the costs in personal well-being 
are also likely to be substantially larger. Should 
similar reductions in labor force participation 
occur among Gulf War/GWOT era veterans, 
and if these declines occur earlier in their work-
ing lives, as has occurred with DC enrollment, 
then the long-term costs of the ongoing US mili-
tary engagements could be (even) larger than 
has been appreciated.
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